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 Executive Summary 
 
In an attempt to reduce compliance costs and improve efficiency, recent environmental 
regulations have relied on market-based incentives. In most cases, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) selects an emissions cap and allows firms to trade pollution permits. The EPA 
typically selects the cap using a "bottom-up" approach to predict the costs of such regulations, 
forecasting how every affected firm will respond to the program. It is uncertain whether firms 
rely on the same predictions in making their compliance decisions; discrepancies between the 
actual and expected behavior of the affected firms could reduce the cost-effectiveness of the 
program. This paper uses stock prices to compare the predictions of the bottom-up studies with 
those of the affected firms. 
 
I focus on a recent tradable permit program, the Nitrogen Oxides Budget Trading 
Program (NBP). Started in 2004, the NBP requires electric generators in the Midwest and East to 
reduce their emissions or purchase permits from other firms. I compare utilities' stock prices with 
the prices that would have occurred in the absence of the new regulation. I make this comparison 
by exploiting variation in the location of generators owned by utilities; the control group consists 
of utilities without any generators in the NBP. I estimate that investors expected the program to 
reduce profits by about $2 billion per year (2000 dollars). Investors expected the NBP to 
primarily affect coal generators, which have larger baseline emission rates than other fossil fuel 
generators. These results agree with previous studies that used the bottom-up approach. 
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Following the Acid Rain Program, which reduced sulfur dioxide emissions from 
power plants, there has been a dramatic increase in market based environmental 
regulations. These programs place a cap on emissions and allow firms to trade permits to 
reduce compliance costs. For example, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, recently adopted by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will expand existing sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) permit programs. In the past few years, members of Congress and 
local governments have proposed a variety of tradable permit programs aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Cost predictions have played an important role in justifying the permit programs 
and determining the emissions caps. Previous research (e.g., Ellerman et al., 2000) uses a 
"bottom-up", or engineering-based approach to forecast costs. These studies simulate a 
detailed model of electricity supply and demand to predict each firm's response to a given 
policy. As documented by Carlson et al. (2000) and Ellerman (2003) most bottom-up 
estimates significantly over-predict the costs of the Acid Rain Program in the early 
1990s. 
The EPA has used engineering-based studies to select emissions caps for 
programs initiated after the Acid Rain Program. It is uncertain whether investors and 
utilities continue to rely on these predictions after learning about the earlier over-
estimates. Disagreement between utilities' and the EPA's expectations could arise either 
because the bottom-up studies did not incorporate an important aspect of the regulation, 
or because utilities did not understand the regulation's effects. Firms would not comply as 
the EPA expected them to, which could limit the cost effectiveness of the market-based 
policy or lead to an inefficient reduction of emissions. 
This paper describes a new approach, using stock prices to estimate investors' and 
firms' expectations. I focus on a recent program, the NOx Budget Trading Program 
(NBP). Assuming that firms are rational and investors are forward looking, I can directly 
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compare firms' predictions with those of the bottom-up studies. The NBP began in 2004, 
and places a cap on NOx emissions from electric utilities and manufacturing plants in the 
Midwest and East. Prior to enactment, several studies (EPA, 1998 and Palmer et al., 
2001) made similar estimates of about $2.2 billion per year.
1 When the EPA proposed the 
NBP in the late 1990s, firms were aware that earlier studies had overestimated costs of 
the Acid Rain Program; they may no longer have trusted this method. 
In comparison, investors expected the NBP to reduce profits by $2 billion per 
year.
2 This figure includes the effect of compliance costs and changes in revenue. On the 
other hand, the engineering-based estimates include only compliance costs. The EPA 
argues that electricity prices would increase and that the change in profits would be 
small; on the other hand, Palmer et al. predict that utilities would bear nearly all the costs. 
My results agree with the Palmer et al. prediction that profits would fall dramatically, 
although investors may have expected higher compliance costs as well as a larger 
increase in revenue. It appears that investors continue to rely on the bottom-up estimates. 
The empirical strategy uses changes in stock prices to predict the cost of the NBP, 
and consists of two stages. First, I estimate the stock prices of utilities in the absence of 
regulation, which I refer to as the counterfactual stock price. More specifically, from 
1990-1995 there was little discussion of regulating NOx emissions in the Midwest and 
Southeast. In 1996 the EPA considered implementing a tradable permit program to 
reduce emissions in these regions, and made a formal proposal in 1998. A number of 
states and utilities sued the EPA to prevent the program, but on March 3, 2000, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the EPA, allowing it to proceed. 
   I exploit variation in the location of utilities to construct a control group, which 
consists of utilities located in the western United States; the NBP did not affect their 
stock prices. I use daily stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
                                                 
1 These estimates differ slightly because of the choice of baseline emissions and the plants included in the 
analysis. There are several other estimates, using similar methodologies, for the Ozone Transport 
Commission program, which covered electric utilities in the Northeast, and for the NBP. See, for example, 
Farrell, et al. (1999) and Krupnick et al. (2000). The latter analyses a subset of states in the NBP, and is 
less comparable to this paper than the Palmer et al. study. 
2 This analysis is comparable to the EPA and Palmer et al. studies because it measures the effect of the 
NBP on the same set of generators. The NBP also includes some large manufacturing plants, which are not 
included in the previous studies or in this paper. The EPA expected that electricity generators would 
account for about 90 percent of the reduction in emissions, so the analysis probably incorporates most of 
the effect of the NBP. 
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(CRSP) to estimate the relationship between the stock prices of the NBP and western 
utilities in the initial period, 1990-1995. I assume this relationship would have held in the 
absence of regulation. I use the actual stock prices of the control group from 1996-2000 
to estimate the counterfactual stock prices of the NBP firms. After the court decision, 
investors knew with certainty that the NBP would occur. The difference between the 
actual and counterfactual stock prices at that time was proportional to the expected cost 
of the NBP. 
In the second stage I characterize how the NBP would affect different types of 
generators. For a given firm, the effect of the NBP is proportional to the number of 
generators in the program. I estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression where 
the dependent variable is the difference between the actual and counterfactual stock 
prices for each utility. The independent variables are the number of coal, natural gas and 
oil generators the firm owns in the NBP region, obtained from the Department of Energy 
(DOE). The coefficients correspond to the changes in expected profits per generator, 
which I refer to as the expected net cost. I use the estimated coefficients to calculate the 
total net cost for all firms in the NBP. 
This approach allows me to characterize how the NBP would affect different 
generators. Coal generators, which have higher emission rates than natural gas and oil, 
would bear nearly all the net costs. The results agree with previous predictions that due to 
the high fixed costs of the primary control technology (selective catalytic reduction) large 
coal generators would adopt the technology. These generators would be able to sell 
excess permits. Small generators would purchase permits or modify their boilers, and 
would have higher costs per unit of output. The results suggest that investors expected 
small generators to be more adversely affected. 
   The change in expected profits for oil and natural gas generators is close to zero. 
There is evidence that natural gas generators became more valuable, although the 
estimate is insignificant. These results reflect differences in emission rates across the 
types of generators, and agree with the EPA's predictions. 
   The empirical strategy is similar to a traditional event study, which would use a 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate abnormal returns. The regression in the 
first stage that yields the counterfactual stock prices is identical to the CAPM. The 
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difference is that the CAPM calculates the cost of the NBP from abnormal returns; I use 
the difference between the actual and counterfactual stock prices. The drawback of the 
CAPM is that the model cannot simultaneously allow for a linear relationship between 
the number of generators and the cost of the NBP, and estimate separate effects for 
different types of generators. For this reason I prefer the two stage approach, but I obtain 
similar results with a CAPM. 
   There are two considerations with estimating the effect of the NBP. Kahn and 
Knittel (2002) find that the enactment of the Acid Rain Program in 1990 did not affect 
the stock prices of electric utilities. They argue that state regulators would raise electricity 
prices to allow utilities to recover the compliance costs, and there would be no effect on 
profits. In contrast, the NBP was proposed in the late 1990s, as the restructuring of the 
electricity industry proceeded.
3 Investors did not expect utilities to recover costs (which 
explains why many utilities sued the EPA), and the program caused stock prices to fall. 
Similar to this study, Ellison and Mullin (2001) consider an event in which 
investors learn about the cost of a policy over a period of several years. They use an 
isotonic regression to estimate the effect of potential health care reform on the stock 
prices of pharmaceutical companies in the early 1990s. I obtain similar results using an 
isotonic regression to those reported in the text. 
Two other tradable permit programs demonstrate the need to compare firms' and 
the EPA's cost estimates. As mentioned above, ex ante cost estimates of the Acid Rain 
Program were too high. More recently, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency 
(IEPA) initiated a permit program for volatile organic compounds (a precursor to ground-
level ozone), which includes manufacturing plants in the Chicago metropolitan area. It 
appears that actual compliance costs have been lower than expected, and the IEPA 
committed to allocating too many permits. The market has not functioned well, with few 
trades and a permit price close to zero. Kosobud et al. (2006) argue that the program has 
not caused any reductions in emissions. 
                                                 
3 Recall that the Michigan decision occurred before the California energy crisis, when the majority of states 
were expected to restructure. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the history of the NBP. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy for estimating the change in expected profits, 
and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The NOx Budget Trading Program
 
I discuss the effect of the NBP and the appellate court decision on stock prices. Had 
the court ruled against the EPA, utilities in the Midwest and Southeast would have been 
regulated under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. This is the counterfactual against 
which I measure costs in the empirical work. 
 
Historical background 
In the mid 1990s, several northeastern states claimed that because of prevailing 
winds, NOx emissions from the Southeast and Midwest were preventing them from 
complying with the Clean Air Act requirements for ozone (NOx is an ozone precursor). 
They argued that the EPA should restrict NOx emissions from the Midwest and 
Southeast. 
In June, 1995, the Ozone Transport Assessment Group convened, consisting of 
representatives from 37 states and Washington, D. C. In June, 1997, the Ozone Transport 
Assessment Group recommended that the EPA establish a NOx tradable permit system 
covering the East and Midwest. 
Based on this report, in September, 1998, the EPA proposed a program to reduce 
emissions. The EPA's air pollution modeling had determined that pollution from 14 states 
contributed significantly to ozone levels in the Northeast. The NBP would include 
Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia and Virginia and Wisconsin. 
Northeastern utilities belonged to a previous NOx permit program, the Ozone Transport 
Commission; utilities in that program would join the NBP.
4 With the exception of 
Florida, the program would cover the entire Midwest and East. In this paper the term 
NBP region refers to states in the Southeast and Midwest, and NBP utilities include 
                                                 
4 The Ozone Transport Commission included Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington, D.C. 
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utilities with fossil fuel generators in the NBP region. In other words, this paper examines 
the effect of expanding the NOx permit program to the Midwest and Southeast. 
In its proposal, each year the EPA would give states a pre-determined number of 
NOx permits. The states would allocate the permits to firms, and the EPA would help 
coordinate a trading program, in which firms could buy and sell permits (cross-state 
transactions were permitted). All firms owning fossil-fuel fired electric generators or 
large, NOx-emitting manufacturing plants would submit permits at the end of each year to 
cover emissions during the previous summer. The EPA set the total level of permits such 
that the expected cost would be $2000 per ton of NOx abated (based on the EPA's 
predicted compliance costs). 
 
Michigan v. EPA (March 3, 2000) 
Several utilities and states challenged the EPA in court. The primary complaint 
was that the EPA had not gone through the proper procedure to create the NBP, and 
could not force utilities to reduce emissions without an act of Congress. The decision by 
the D.C. Court of Appeals on March 3, 2000, in Michigan et al. v. EPA et al., resolved 
the dispute, finding mostly in favor of the EPA. 
The plaintiffs argued that the EPA had acted improperly in three ways: the 
original Clean Air Act implied that the EPA could not use compliance costs to include 
certain states and not others; the EPA's modeling was not sufficiently detailed to trace 
emissions to sources in specific states, and could not be used to determine which states to 
include; and the tradable permit system did not allow the states sufficient freedom to 
reduce their emissions, violating federal law. The court dismissed these claims, although 
it excluded Wisconsin from the program, and the EPA proceeded with its plan.
5 There are 
                                                 
5 Several states had specific claims that they should not be included in the NBP. Thus, it was possible that 
even if the court permitted the NBP, these states would not participate. For example, Wisconsin and South 
Carolina argued that they should not be included; the court ruled that there was not enough evidence to 
include Wisconsin, but dismissed South Carolina's arguments. The court ruled that the EPA had not 
justified including all of Georgia and Missouri, but at the time of the decision it seemed likely that at least 
parts of these states would be included. I consider Georgia and Missouri as belonging to the NBP; they will 
join the program in 2007. 
    In addition, the court considered several issues regarding the calculation of the state budgets. Although 
most of these remained unresolved (they were sent back to the EPA for clarification and additional 
rulemaking), the decision may have affected the expected cost of the NBP, conditional on implementation. 
For example, the court supported the EPA's inclusion of certain small generating units. I address this issue 
below. 
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two distinct periods between 1990 and 2000. From 1990-1995 there was little public 
discussion about NOx regulation. The second period spanned 1996-2000, in which there 
was considerable uncertainty about whether and how the EPA would require a reduction 
in NOx emissions. The press first publicized the OTAG meetings in late 1996 and it is 
unlikely that investors knew that the EPA might compel utilities to reduce NOx emissions 
before 1996. Press coverage increased significantly in 1997 and 1998. As I show below, 
there was little movement of NBP stock prices before 1997, supporting the use of this 
starting date. The second period ends on March 3, 2000, when investors knew with 
certainty that the NBP would occur. 
 
Implications of the Michigan decision 
Broadly speaking, there were two possible outcomes of the litigation: firms would 
either be regulated by the NBP or by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
6 I decompose 
the change in expected profits for an NBP firm at timet,) , into three components:   (TC Et
 
) ( ) ( ) ( C E G P E TC E t t t ⋅ ⋅ = ,     (1) 
 
where is the expected probability at time that the EPA would create the NBP,G is 
the number of fossil-fuel generators located in the NBP region, and is the expected 
net cost per generator. The variable includes the cost of installing abatement 
technology, purchasing permits, and any other behavior caused by the program. 
) (P Et t
) (C Et
) (C Et
There are two important features of equation (1). First, the total cost increases 
linearly with the number of generators, which reflects a central aspect of the NBP. Firms 
may comply with the regulation in several ways: they may purchase permits, install a 
control technology (e.g., selective catalytic reduction), or modify their boilers. Consider a 
                                                 
6 This assumption is for simplicity. In fact, there were several other possibilities. For example, the court 
may have granted the EPA the authority to enforce emissions reductions, but not by means of a tradable 
permit program. More generally, the expected cost of NOx regulation at time t is equal to the sum of the 
probability of each mutually exclusive outcome, multiplied by the cost of the outcome. The analysis would 
be similar to the text, where Et(TC) would correspond to the effect of any regulation, relative to the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments. As in the text, after the Michigan decision the change in stock price would 
reflect the cost of the NBP, compared to the continuance of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, because 
the probability of any other outcome would be zero. 
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firm that complies by purchasing permits and assume that its generators have the same 
generating capacity and baseline emission rates. The firm's cost is proportional to the 
number of permits it purchases, which is the difference between its total emissions and its 
allocated permits. The allocation would be proportional to total baseline emissions and 
the utility would purchase the same number of permits for each generator. Thus, the total 
cost of the NBP would be proportional to the number of generators. The argument is 
similar for generators that install selective catalytic reduction or modify their boilers, 
because there are constant returns to scale across generators.
7
Second, the expected cost, , is measured relative to the counterfactual of 
continuing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. These are the regulations that govern 
the western utilities, making them the appropriate control group. 
) (TC Et
Before the Ozone Transport Assessment Group convened, was equal to 
zero because both and were zero. Between that point and the Michigan 
decision, the probability was between zero and one, and was less than the 
conditional cost, . There was considerable uncertainty during this period 
and may have been much less than one; for example, on May 25, 1999 the same 
court issued a stay, preventing the EPA from proceeding.
) (TC Et
) (P Et ) (C Et
) (TC Et
) (C E G t ⋅
) (P Et
8,   9 After the Michigan decision 
the change in profits was equal to the conditional cost (i.e.,  ) ( ) ( C E G TC E t t ⋅ = ), because 
the probability was equal to one.
                                                 
7 In this discussion I assume that Et(P) and Et(C) are the same across all generators. I relax these 
assumptions in the empirical work and estimate the cost per generator by fuel type and size. 
8 The Appeals Court did not lift the stay in the Michigan decision. The EPA interpreted this as a formality, 
and in April of 2000 it sent letters to the NBP states, writing that they must submit their plans for 
implementing the program. 
    The Court lifted the stay on June 22, 2000, in a decision by the full panel. It does not appear that this 
decision addressed any new legal questions, supporting the use of March 3 as the date on which uncertainty 
was resolved. Below, I show that I obtain similar results if I use June 22 instead of March 3 as the end of 
the event window. Observers at the time of the June 22 decision did not expect any further appeals, so I do 
not consider subsequent dates. 
9 Investors probably anticipated the Michigan decision. Specifically, in the 1998 proposal, the EPA found 
that 22 states and Washington D.C. contributed significantly to the non-attainment of counties in the same 
region. The EPA used the 8-hour ozone standard to evaluate attainment, but the court ruled in May of 1999 
that this standard was not appropriate. In late 1999 the EPA published its conclusion that the same states 
contributed to non-attainment using the 1-hour standard, which had already been established as a legitimate 
measure. Thus, the EPA had addressed some of the legal issues before the ruling, but the court had not yet 
ruled that it was satisfied. 
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The decision also affected . Based on the text of the ruling, the direction of 
the effect is ambiguous, and the courts and the EPA did not resolve the disputes that 
affected until 2001. As discussed below, the empirical strategy measures , 
just after the Michigan decision.
) (C Et
) (C Et ) (C Et
10  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
I derive the estimating equation and discuss the identification of expected net 
costs of the NBP. The empirical strategy is similar to a traditional event study, and I 
discuss the differences below. 
 
Effect of the Michigan decision on the stock prices of firms 
I consider a set of electric utilities located in the Midwest and Southeast. They 
maximize profits and are risk neutral. Time is discrete, denoted byt. Firmiowns a 
number of generating plants. At date 0 = t , there are no plans for environmental 
regulation, and the stock price of firmiat time0, , is proportional to expected profits. I 
express the stock price of firm at time
0 i P
i 0 = t as: 
 
0 0 0 i i i P ω π + = , 
 
where 0 i π is the expected discounted profits from the firm's fossil fuel generators (coal, 
natural gas and oil); and 0 i ω is the expected discounted profits from non-fossil fuel 
                                                 
10 Because of certain legal technicalities, after the decision it was still uncertain whether states in the 
Midwest or Southeast would be included in the program in 2003, as opposed to 2004. This issue was not 
resolved until June of 2001, in Appalachian et al. v. EPA. Following that decision, the EPA decided that the 
Ozone Transport Commission states would enter the new program in 2003, and other states would enter in 
2004. Part of Georgia and Missouri, as well as small generators and industrial boilers, will enter in 2007. 
    At the time of the Michigan decision investors did not know when the NBP would begin and whether it 
would include Georgia and Missouri. In the empirical work, I treat all states in the Midwest and Southeast 
as being equally likely to be in the NBP in 2004. This should not create a large bias for two reasons: first, 
the share of generators in Georgia and Missouri in the total number of affected generators is small; second, 
I use a discount rate of 6 percent, so if investors in 2000 expected the NBP to begin in 2003 instead of 
2004, the results would overestimate the expected annual cost by 6 percent. 
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generators and other businesses owned by the firm.
11 I include non-fossil fuel generators 
(nuclear and hydroelectric) in the latter category because they do not emit NOx. 
At date , a committee forms to investigate the benefit and cost of reducing 
NO
1 = t
x emissions for all fossil fuel fired generators. The time 1 = t corresponds to the 
formation of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group. There is considerable uncertainty 
as firms do not have any information about the extent of the emission reductions or the 
type of regulation (i.e., command-and-control versus a tradable permit system). 
I decompose a generator's profits into two parts:  ) ( ~ TC Eit it it − = π π . I 
define as the absolute change in expected profits at time t due to NO ) (TC Eit x regulation. 
Thus,  it π ~  corresponds to the counterfactual profits, if no regulation were expected. 
At time the EPA announces that it will create a program, the NBP, which 
will reduce NO
2 = t
x emissions and allow firms to trade permits. There is some uncertainty 
about the costs of the program, and whether the EPA will be able to implement it. There 
are three components of :  ) (TC Eit
 
) ( ) ( ) ( C E G P E TC E t i t it ⋅ ⋅ = . 
 
The total number of fossil-fuel generators for firm i is .) is the expected 
probability, at timet, that the NBP will take effect. is the conditional expected net 
cost of the program per generator, and includes the cost of all compliance strategies. The 
previous section discussed the linear relationship between expected costs and the number 
of generators. 
i G (P Et
) (C Et
The stock price of firmiat time  (i.e., after the EPA's announcement) is given 
by: 
2 > t
it t i t it it C E G P E P ω π + ⋅ ⋅ − = ) ( ) ( ~      (2) 
 
it P  is different from for three reasons: expected discounted fossil fuel generating 
profits, 
0 i P
it π ~ , may have changed for causes unrelated to the NBP; the firm's expected 
                                                 
11 More precisely, πi0 is the expected discounted profits per share of stock, and similarly for ω i0. 
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profits from other operations,  0 i ω , may have changed; and the NBP reduced expected 
profits. 
I define the variable it P
~
, as the counterfactual stock price. it P
~
is the value of the 
firm at time , had the EPA never announced its plans to create the NBP: t it it it P ω π + = ~ ~
. 
The difference between the actual and counterfactual stock price is given by: 
 
) ( ) (
~
C E G P E P P t i t it it ⋅ ⋅ − = −       ( 3 )  
 
This quantity is equal to the expected cost of the NBP, at datet. 
At time τ = t , the obstacles preventing the implementation of the NBP are 
removed. At timeτ , the expected probability, , is equal to one;  ) (P Eτ τ corresponds to 
the day of the Michigan decision, March 3, 2000. The difference between the actual and 




C E G P P i i i τ τ τ ⋅ − = − .         ( 4 )  
 
The left hand side is equal to the expected cost of the NBP, at dateτ . 
 
Identification of expected costs 
A comparison of equations (3) and (4) reveals one of the main difficulties with 
measuring the effect of the program. The right hand side of equation (3) contains two 
unobserved variables: the expected probability that the NBP will occur, and the 
conditional expected cost. I cannot identify the net cost of the NBP when the probability 
is less than one. After the Michigan decision, the expected probability is equal to one, and 
there is one unobserved variable on the right hand side of equation (4).  
Equation (4) is the basis for the estimating equation. The expected cost of the 
NBP per generator, , is the coefficient in a regression of the difference between the 
actual and counterfactual stock price at time
) (C Eτ
τ on the number of NBP generators. As I 
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discuss below, it is straightforward to measure a firm's stock price ( ) and generators 
( ). I focus on estimating the counterfactual stock price,
τ i P
N
i G τ i P
~
. 
I construct three groups of utilities, according to the locations of their generators. 
The control group consists of utilities without any generators in the East or Midwest. The 
NBP did not affect their stock prices after the Michigan decision. I refer to these firms 
with the superscript . The second group contains fossil fuel generators in the Midwest 
or Southeast, and has the superscript . The third group contains all other utilities, most 
of which were in the Ozone Transport Commission; I denote them with the superscriptO. 
C
N
I assume that before investors learn of the NBP, there is a stable relationship 
between the stock returns of the control group and the returns of other utilities. The stock 
return of firmion datetis: , where  is the stock price,  
is the firm's dividends, and is the risk free interest rate. Let be the return of a firm 
in the NBP region or the Northeast, and let be the return of a western utility. I 
define
f
t it it it it R P D P R − + = − ] / ) ln[( 1 it P it D
f




t R as the mean return of firms in the control group, and estimate the following 




t i i it X R R η ϕ β α + + + =       ( 5 )  
 
where i α is a firm-specific intercept, i β is the correlation between the return of firmiand 
the average return of firms in the control group, and it η is an error term. The 
matrix includes the average return of natural gas utilities and three factors from Fama 
and French (1993): the difference between the returns of portfolios of small and large 
stocks; the difference between the returns of portfolios of value and growth stocks; and 
the excess market return. The vector
t X
i ϕ is a firm specific vector of coefficients.
12 
Observations are daily, and the sample spans January 2, 1990 to December 29, 1995. The 
endpoints are determined by data availability (see below) and the fact that it is unlikely 
                                                 
12 Among the independent variables the mean stock return of the control group,
C
t R , explains the largest 
share of the variance of the dependent variable. Omitting the other variables does not affect the results. 
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that investors knew about the potential for regulation in the Midwest and Southeast 
before 1996. Note that this regression allows for a different relationship between the 
control variables and the stock return for each firm in the NBP and Northeast. 
I compute the estimated counterfactual market returns during the event 




t i i it X R R ϕ β α ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + = . 
 
The abnormal return for firmiat time is .  t it it R R ˆ −
An important identifying assumption, as in any event study, is that the 
parameters i α , i β and i ϕ do not change during the event window (1996-2000). This 
assumption is necessary to estimate the counterfactual stock prices. By assumption, there 
are no shocks, other than the NBP, which differentially affect firms in the treatment and 
control groups. Below I present several sources of evidence supporting this assumption. 
I use the counterfactual return to estimate the cost of the NBP in the second stage. 
I calculate the counterfactual stock price, , using the actual stock price on December 





t it it D P R R P − + = −1 ˆ ) ˆ exp( ˆ .       ( 6 )  
 
I define the prediction error, i ε , as the difference between the counterfactual stock 




i i i G P P ε δ τ τ − ⋅ − = − ˆ .       ( 7 )  
 
The change in the stock price of firmi, , depends linearly on the number of 
generators in the NBP region, . The parameter
τ τ i i P P ˆ −
N
i G δ is the expected net cost of the NBP 
per generator at time τ. 
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The analysis includes several simplifications, which I now relax. First, I have 
assumed that the expected net costs are the same for different types of generators. I 
partition firmi's generators into two groups, indexed by the letter j : coal and natural 
gas/oil. I estimate j δ for both types of generators. Below I also consider specifications 
that separate generators by size and fuel type. 
Second, I account for the effect on stock prices of the Ozone Transport 
Commission, the NOx tradable permit program in the Northeast. Changes in the expected 
costs of this program between 1990-2000 would affect stock prices, as would differences 
between the expected cost of the NBP and Ozone Transport Commission. Consequently I 
control for the number of Ozone Transport Commission generators in the estimating 
equation.
13
It is possible that utilities changed the types of generators they own in response to 
the NBP. In particular, since coal generators have substantially higher NOx emissions 
rates, utilities may have sold or retired coal generators, and constructed natural gas/oil 
generators. I find some evidence that this occurred, and consequently, the independent 
variables are counts of generators in 1995, which could not have been affected by the 
NBP. The parameter j δ corresponds to the cost of the NBP per generator owned in 1995. 
The final consideration is that it may have taken time for investors to understand 
the implications of the Michigan decision. I compare the actual and counterfactual prices 
seven days after the decision, on March 10, 2000. The results are insensitive to different 
length windows. 
To measure costs as positive numbers, I multiply equation (7) by negative one. 









j i i G G P P ε ι δ τ τ + ⋅ + ⋅ = − ∑ ∑ + + 7 7 ˆ ,    (8) 
 
                                                 
13 Because northeastern utilities already participated in a tradable permit program and the NBP may have 
affected their stock prices, I do not include them in the control group. However, if I estimate the cost of the 
NBP using both western and northeastern utilities in the control group I obtain similar, though smaller cost 
estimates. 
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where j ι is the coefficient on the number of generators belonging to firmiin the Northeast 
for generators of type j . The parameters of interest are C δ and NO δ , which are the cost per 
generator of the NBP, for coal and natural gas/oil generators. I use the estimate of j δ and 
the total number of generators in the NBP to calculate the total effect of the NBP on 
expected profits. 
This empirical strategy is similar to a CAPM-based event study, which would use 
equation (5) to estimate abnormal returns during the event period. As in a CAPM 
approach, I estimate the relationship between the stock prices of NBP firms and a control 
group during the initial period. I assume that there are no differential shocks to NBP 
firms between January 2, 1996 and March 3, 2000. The difference is that the CAPM 
calculates the cost of the NBP from abnormal returns. My approach uses the difference 
between the actual and counterfactual stock prices. 
The shortcoming of the CAPM is that it cannot simultaneously allow for a linear 
relationship between the number of generators and profits, and allow for the estimation of 
costs by generator type. It is possible to use the CAPM to estimate abnormal returns 
separately for each firm, then compute the average effect across firms. However, this 
specification would not allow me to determine the effect of the NBP on individual 
generator types. Alternatively, I could estimate equation (5) over the entire period from 
1990-2000, and include a dummy variable equal to one during 1996-2000, which would 
measure the average abnormal return over the second period. By interacting this variable 
with the share of coal generators, I could estimate the abnormal returns for these 
generators. However, because the dependent variable is the rate of return, this 
specification would not allow for a linear relationship between the number of generators 
and profits. I report the results of both types of CAPM specifications below, and obtain 




To estimate equations (5) and (8) I match generator data from the DOE with stock 
price data from CRSP. Every year the DOE collects information on all electric generating 
plants in Form 860. This data is available on the DOE website beginning in 1990; I use 
 16 
date from 1990-2001.
14 For each investor-owned-utility and year, I calculate the number 
of generators by state and generator type. I distinguish two types of fossil fuel generators, 
according to the primary fuel: coal and natural gas/oil. Coal generators have much higher 
NOx emission rates and are larger, over 280 megawatts (MW) on average; natural gas and 
oil generators are about 40MW. 
I match the DOE utilities to stock prices in CRSP by company name. I use 
additional information, such as subsidiary names, in cases where the DOE and CRSP 
names do not match exactly. Utilities in the final data set satisfy several criteria: they are 
publicly traded, their stocks trade continuously from 1990-2000, and they are not located 
in Alaska or Hawaii. 
The sample includes 70 firms. There was a wave of mergers and acquisitions in 
the late 1990s, coinciding with the partial restructuring of the electric power industry. 
The sample does not include utilities whose stocks discontinued trading as a result of a 
merger or acquisition.
15 The sample contains most large utilities in the NBP region. The 
utilities in the balanced panel own 80 percent of the fossil fuel capacity of publicly traded 
utilities in the NBP, and about 60 percent of the total fossil fuel capacity in the NBP. 
Tables 1-3 provide summary information. Table 1 lists the names of the 70 
utilities in the sample. The first column contains the control group: utilities that own 
generators in the West, but not in the Midwest or East during the entire period from 
1990-2000. The second column lists the names of utilities with fossil fuel generators in 
the NBP region, and the third column contains the remaining utilities. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the firms listed in Table 1. For the three 
categories of utilities, Panel A shows the mean market capitalization on December 29, 
1995, total generating capacity, in MW, and fossil fuel generating capacity, with standard 
deviations in parentheses. NBP utilities have larger market capitalizations and total 
generating capacities. Equation (5) can account for these differences because it 
incorporates the possibility that firms have different expected returns and factor loadings. 
                                                 
14 I use the 2001 data to compile the names of investor owned utilities. I cannot distinguish investor-owned-
utilities from other utility types (e.g., municipal) prior to 2001. 
15 The sample includes some utilities that purchased other utilities, such as American Electric Power, which 
acquired Central and South West in 2000. Below I show that the results are unaffected by dropping firms 
involved in mergers. Note that the independent variables are the number of generators owned in 1995, and 
should not include the effect of mergers and divestitures in the late 1990s. 
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Panel B shows the share in total generating capacity for coal and natural gas/oil 
generators in 1995. The total fossil fuel share is similar for western and NBP utilities, 
about 0.85, although NBP utilities have a larger share of coal. Eastern utilities have a 
similar fraction of total fossil fuel capacity, but are weighted more towards natural 
gas/oil. 
Panel C shows the corresponding shares in 2000. Relative to 1995, western 
utilities have similar portfolios of generators, though there was a slight transition away 
from coal. NBP utilities show a larger decrease in coal generators and a corresponding 
increase in natural gas/oil. Northeastern utilities also move away from coal. This pattern 
suggests that utilities may have adjusted the composition of their generators in response 
to environmental regulation or for other reasons. I use data from 1995 to construct the 
independent variables; the NBP could not have affected generators owned in 1995. 
Table 3 compares the generators of the NBP firms in the balanced panel with 
other generators in the NBP region (i.e., generators owned by other utilities or non-
utilities). The generators of NBP firms are quite similar in size. This agreement, 
combined with the fact that the sample includes about 60 percent of the fossil fuel 
generating capacity in the NBP, implies that firms in the sample would experience a 
similar change in profits to other firms, and that the estimation results should be 




Estimated counterfactual stock prices 
I first discuss the results of estimating the counterfactual stock prices. Figure 1 
shows the actual and counterfactual stock prices of NBP utilities from 1990-2000. I 
estimate equation (5) and use equation (6) to calculate the actual and counterfactual stock 
prices for each firm. I compute the mean for each day, normalizing prices to one on the 
last day of the estimation sample, December 29, 1995 (denoted by the first vertical line). 
The figure shows the 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using the standard error 
formula in Salinger, 1992 (which accounts for correlation over time and across firms). 
The second vertical line indicates the date of the Michigan decision, March 3, 2000. 
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During the estimation period and until late 1996 the actual and counterfactual 
prices follow one another quite closely; the discrepancies are less than a few percent. 
After 1996, as investors learned about the Ozone Transport Assessment Group, the actual 
stock price falls below the counterfactual. The actual price continues to decline until late 
1998, when the EPA published its proposal to establish the NBP. Between 1998 and 
2000, the difference between the two series increases considerably, as the NBP became 
more likely. The difference stabilizes after the court decision. 
Figure 2 provides support for the identification strategy. This figure is constructed 
using the same control group as in Figure 1, but it plots the average actual and 
counterfactual stock prices of utilities in the third category. Recall that most of these 
utilities were in the Ozone Transport Commission and were affected much less by the 
NBP. The actual and counterfactual prices are nearly identical in 2000.
16 I can reject at 
the 5 percent level the hypothesis that the difference between the actual and 
counterfactual prices for these utilities is as large as the difference for the NBP utilities. 
 
Estimated annual costs 
I now discuss the estimates of equation (8), shown in Table 4. In each regression, 
there are 48 observations, one for each utility in the NBP and the Northeast. The 
dependent variable is the difference between the counterfactual and actual stock prices on 
March 10, 2000. The counterfactual is calculated using equations (5) and (6) and is the 
estimated stock price, had the NBP not been created. In column 1 the independent 
variables are the total number of fossil fuel generators in the NBP and Ozone Transport 
Commission regions. The coefficient on the number of NBP generators is 0.11, with 
standard error 0.03, which is significant at the 1 percent level.
17 Assuming a discount rate 
of 6 percent (following the analysis of the EPA, 1998), the NBP would cost about $1.3 
million per year for the average generator in the sample. 
Table 5 reports the estimated annual cost of the NBP from the results in Table 4. I 
first calculate the net cost to utilities in the sample using the total number of NBP fossil 
                                                 
16 Note that the estimates are less precise, and the two series differ somewhat more than in Figure 1 during 
the estimation period. 
17 For clarity of presentation I do not report the other estimated coefficients. In most cases, these estimates 
are small and insignificant, in agreement with the results shown in Figure 2. 
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fuel generators and the number of shares of stock of the firms. I scale the sample estimate 
by the ratio of the total fossil fuel generating capacity in the NBP (obtained from EPA, 
1998) to the fossil fuel capacity in the sample.
18 The specification in column 1 of Table 4 
implies an annual net cost of about $1.95 billion (2000 dollars), with a standard error of 
$610 million. In comparison, the EPA and Palmer et al. estimate compliance costs of 
about $2.2 billion. The results in Table 5 imply either that investors expected similar 
costs but did not expect utilities to be able to pass on the costs to consumers, or that 
investors expected larger compliance costs. The former interpretation agrees with Palmer 
et al., who predict that the NBP would have a small effect on electricity prices, and that 
utilities would bear most of the costs. 
In column 2 I investigate whether the expected costs of the NBP varied across the 
two types of generators. Since coal generators generally have much higher NOx emission 
rates than natural gas and oil generators, they would be more likely to purchase permits 
or install capital equipment to reduce emissions. Many natural gas and oil generators 
would have baseline emissions similar to their allotted permits, and would not be affected 
by the NBP. I re-estimate equation (8), where the independent variables are the number 
of generators of each firm, by region and generator type (coal and natural gas/oil). There 
are considerable differences across the generator types. The estimated change in stock 
price per coal generator is 0.25 with standard error 0.06, significant at the one percent 
level. The annual change in profits for a coal generator is $3 million, which is similar to 
the EPA's estimate of compliance costs. 
The point estimate on natural gas and oil generators is close to zero and 
insignificant. I can reject at the one percent level that the estimate is as large as the coal 
estimate. This result seems plausible, given the differences in emission rates noted above. 
I use the estimates in column 2 to predict the annual cost of the program, similarly 
to column 1. I obtain an estimated cost of $2.02 billion per year, with standard error $590 
million, reported in column 2 of Table 5. This is close to the estimate in column 1. 
As noted above, the estimates in column 2 correspond to the change in expected 
profits for generators operating in 1995. If firms retired coal generators in the late 1990s, 
                                                 
18 I scale by capacity instead of by the number of generators because I do not have data on the expected 
number of generators in the NBP. 
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the effect of the NBP on coal generators operating in 2000 might be smaller. In column 3 
I use the 2000 generator counts as independent variables. The results are similar to the 
baseline and suggest that the NBP would cost an operating coal generator about $3 
million per year. This similarity suggests that the changes in generator shares reported in 
Table 2 were not correlated with the independent variables.
19  
Columns 4-6 of Table 4 report several other specifications. The corresponding 
total cost estimates are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 5. Oil and natural gas generators 
differ somewhat in size and baseline emission rates (natural gas generators are larger and 
emit less NOx). In column 4 I separate these categories. The results provide some 
evidence that expected profits for natural gas generators increased, presumably because 
their utilization rates would increase or they would yield excess permits. However, the 
estimate is insignificant, and I cannot reject the hypothesis that the natural gas and oil 
estimates are jointly equal to zero. 
In columns 5 and 6 I consider whether investors expected the NBP to affect large 
generators differently from small generators. Most of the costs of installing selective 
catalytic reduction (the main control technology) are fixed, and many observers expected 
that only large coal generators would find it profitable to install the technology. The 
emissions from these generators would decline by as much as 90 percent, allowing their 
owners to sell excess permits and recover much of the costs of selective catalytic 
reduction. Smaller generators would purchase permits and would have a larger decline in 
profits, per unit of generating capacity. Because the independent variables are counts of 
generators, if large and small generators had similar emission rates and respond similarly 
to the regulation, the coefficient on large generators would be significantly greater. On 
the other hand, if the coefficient on small generators is similar in magnitude or larger, this 
would imply that investors expected small generators to be more adversely affected, after 
normalizing by output. 
In column 5 I separate coal generators into two groups, depending on whether 
they have a capacity above 280MW (the average capacity for the sample, shown in Table 
3). As column 5 shows, the coefficient on large generators is slightly smaller. This result 
                                                 
19 The results are similar to those reported in column 3 if I instrument the 2000 generator counts with the 
1995 counts of generators. 
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is consistent with the EPA's prediction that large generators would install selective 
catalytic reduction.
20
Large natural gas generators have lower baseline emission rates and higher 
output, and the EPA would allocate more permits to them. In column 6 I separate natural 
gas/oil generators according to whether their capacity is above 40MW. The estimates 
suggest that investors expected large natural gas/oil generators to benefit slightly more 
from the NBP, though the estimate is insignificant. 
As Table 5 shows, the annual cost estimates from these specifications are quite 
similar to the baseline. I conclude from Tables 4 and 5 that the effect of the NBP on 
electricity generators is consistent with the EPA's expectations about which utilities 
would be most affected by the program. Coal generators, particularly small generators, 
would be more adversely affected. The estimates broadly agree with the EPA's and 
Palmer et al.'s predictions of compliance behavior, namely, that large coal generators 
would be more likely to install selective catalytic reduction, and that their profits would 
fall by less, per unit of output. 
 
CAPM estimate of the cost of the NBP 
 
For comparison, I use a CAPM to estimate the cost of the NBP. I modify equation 
(5) to obtain the following equation: 
 
it t i i t
C
t i i it N X R R υ φ ϕ β α + + + + = ,     (9) 
 
where variables and parameters are defined as in equation (5), except that t spans January 
2, 1990 to March 10, 2000. The variable is an indicator, equal to one 
if ; the parameter of interest is
t N
] 00 / 10 / 3 , 96 / 2 / 1 [ ∈ t i φ , which measures the average 
abnormal return for each firm. 
                                                 
20 Expected costs may also vary for coal generators depending on whether they already have a control 
technology installed before 1995. I use data from the DOE's Form 767 to identify such generators, where 
the most common technology is a low-NOx burner. However, there is not enough variation across firms to 
identify a different effect for generators with low-NOx burners and those without. 
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Equation (9) is a standard CAPM, which allows for firm-specific coefficients on 
the independent variables, and estimates a separate cumulative abnormal return for each 
firm.
21 I use the estimates of i φ to compute the total cost of the NBP. 
I estimate a similar specification, in which the effect of the NBP is proportional to 
the number of fossil fuel generators in the program. I define the variable as firm i's 
share of NBP fossil fuel generators in total generators. I modify equation (9) to obtain: 
i F
 
it t i i t
C
t i i it N F X R R ν λ ϕ β α + + + + = .    (10) 
 
I report the results of estimating equations (9) and (10) in columns 7 and 8 of Table 5. I 
estimate these equations by a Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimator. The standard 
errors account for correlation across firms and over time (see Salinger, 1992). These 
regressions yield estimated average abnormal returns, which I convert to cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) using the number of days in the estimation window. I then use 
the CARs to calculate the change in market capitalization for firms in the sample, and 
scale this estimate by the ratio of generating capacity in the NBP to the fossil fuel 
generating capacity in the sample. The annual cost estimate using equation (9) is $2.82 
billion, and is $1.67 billion for equation (10). The latter estimate is significant at the 10 
percent level, and is similar to the baseline estimate of $2 billion in column 2. As noted 
above, I prefer the baseline specification because it allows the number of generators to 





Potential Omitted Variables 
 
                                                 
21 It is possible to estimate an equation similar to equation (9), but imposing the restriction that φi is equal 
across firms. This specification is not numerically equivalent to the one reported in the text, but the 
resulting cost estimate is nearly identical. 
22 As discussed in the introduction, it is also possible to estimate the cost of the program with an isotonic 
regression (see Ellison and Mullin, 2001). The main assumption in this approach is that the expected cost of 
the program is monotonically increasing between 1996 and 2000. I obtain a similar estimate, of about $2.3 
billion per year. 
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The main potential source of bias is an omitted variable correlated with the 
independent variables. I investigate a number of possibilities below, such as the sulfur 
dioxide regulation, and find that they do not affect the results. 
The first two columns in Table 6 focus on demand and productivity shocks. I 
merge Compustat data with the CRSP/DOE data set to obtain each firm's net earnings in 
1995 and 2000. I include the change in this variable from 1995 to 2000, to control for 
persistent unobserved productivity shocks during this time period. The main estimates in 
column 1 of Table 6 are similar to the baseline, suggesting that such shocks are not 
affecting the results. The estimated coefficient on net earnings is insignificant. 
A negative demand shock to the NBP region in the late 1990s would cause a 
decline in revenue, as well as a decline in stock prices. In column 2 I use Compustat data 
to control for the change in revenue between 1995 and 2000. The main estimates are 
unaffected and the estimate on revenue is negative and insignificant (not reported).
23,24
The Acid Rain Program may have affected the values of generators in the NBP 
region, biasing the results. This program was created by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, and consisted of two phases: Phase I spanned 1995-2000, and Phase II 
began in 2000. Phase I included 262 large boilers (mainly coal fired) with especially high 
sulfur dioxide emission rates. Phase II included a wider range of generators. Many of the 
generators in both phases are located in the NBP region. 
As discussed in the introduction, Kahn and Knittel find that stock prices did not 
respond to the creation of the program in 1990, arguing that state regulators would allow 
utilities to recover compliance costs. However, as electricity restructuring began in the 
mid 1990s, stock prices may have fallen if investors did not expect utilities to be able to 
recover future costs of the Acid Rain Program. In that case, the baseline estimates of the 
NBP would include the effect of the Acid Rain Program and would be biased away from 
zero. 
                                                 
23 Other possible measures of productivity or profits, available from Compustat, yield similar results. 
24 A negative demand shock to the NBP region would affect all generators, including non fossil fuel 
generators. I can test for such a shock by including counts of non fossil fuel generators as independent 
variables in the baseline regression. If a decline in demand had a large effect on profits, the coefficient on 
non fossil fuel generators would be positive and significant, and the coefficient on coal generators would be 
smaller and possibly insignificant. In practice, the coefficient on coal generators is similar to the baseline 
and precisely estimated, and the coefficient on non fossil fuel generators is small and insignificant. 
However, there is not enough variation in non fossil fuel generators to reject a large change in profits. 
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In column 3 I separate Phase I coal generators from other coal generators, using 
the DOE's Clean Air Act Database. If profit shocks to Phase I generators were driving the 
results, the coefficient on non-Phase I generators would be smaller than the baseline 
estimate, and the coefficient on Phase I generators would be larger. This is not the case; 
the estimate on non-Phase I generators is 0.34, with standard error 0.19. The coefficient 
on Phase I generators is 0.15, and is insignificant. Thus, I find little evidence that shocks 
to Phase I generators affected profits. 
More generally, restructuring may have reduced expected profits if utilities did 
not expect to be able to recover the costs of previously made capital investments. In 
column 4 I separate coal generators according to whether they have a scrubber. This 
specification differs from column 3 because some firms installed scrubbers to comply 
with Phase I, and others installed them because of different regulations. Furthermore, 
many generators in Phase I did not install scrubbers. Utilities' stock prices would 
decrease during restructuring if they could not recover installation costs, which could be 
several hundred million dollars. This would have a similar effect as Phase I status; the 
estimate on coal generators without scrubbers would be smaller than the baseline estimate 
and the coefficient on coal generators with scrubbers would be larger. The estimate on 
the non scrubber category is precisely estimated and nearly identical to the baseline, 
suggesting that this is not a major concern. These results agree with the hypothesis that 
utilities expected to recover the costs of the Acid Rain Program and other sunk 
investments during restructuring. 
Litigation unrelated to the NBP may have affected stock prices. During the late 
1990s, the EPA sued several utilities for not complying with the New Source Review 
provisions of the Clean Air Act. New Source Review requires that a utility substantially 
reduce emissions when it modifies an existing power plant. The EPA claimed that some 
utilities had performed modifications without installing the appropriate technology; the 
utilities argued that these activities were routine maintenance, and were not covered by 
New Source Review. Although many of these lawsuits were not resolved before March 3, 
2000, stock prices may have fallen in anticipation of expected costs, creating an upward 
bias. 
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In column 5 I omit the 5 NBP firms in the sample that were sued by the EPA: 
American Electric Power, Cinergy, Dominion Resources, Ohio Edison and Southern. The 
estimate on coal generators would be smaller than the baseline if New Source Review 
litigation were driving the results; in fact it is larger. The most likely interpretation of this 
result is not that the litigation had no effect on stock prices, but that the NBP superseded 
the litigation. That is, the NBP meant that these firms would either have to install the 
same equipment as required by New Source Review, or that they would incur other costs 
(e.g., from purchasing permits), which would have similar effects. 
Mergers of NBP firms between 1996-2000 may bias the estimates. There are 
several possible concerns related to mergers, which would imply that the sample is not 
representative of all firms affected by the NBP. First the sample does not include some 
merger participants because their stocks discontinued trading. If the compliance costs for 
these firms were different from firms in the sample, the results would be biased. Second, 
if a firm is involved in a merger and its stock continues trading, the merger may affect the 
stock price for reasons related to the NBP (e.g., the compliance costs are lower for the 
acquired firm) or for other reasons. Using information from the DOE (2000), in column 6 
I omit firms involved in mergers between 1995-2000, or involved in proposed mergers, 
as of April, 2000. The results are nearly identical to the baseline, suggesting that the 
sample of utilities is representative. 
Investors may have viewed the Michigan decision as a precedent under which the 
EPA could impose other regulations on the utility industry. The estimates in Table 4 
would include the effects of potential regulations, creating bias. For example, several 
states were initially included in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group, but were not 
included in the NBP. Investors may have expected that the Michigan decision would 
enable the EPA to expand regulation to include these states (essentially, this will occur 
when the Clean Air Interstate Rule begins in 2009). The decision would have had a 
negative effect on the stock prices of utilities to the west of the NBP, biasing the NBP 
estimates towards zero. Restricting the control group to the 10 utilities located in the 
original Ozone Transport Assessment Group states but not in the NBP would lead to 
smaller estimates. In column 7, the estimates on generator counts are quite similar to the 
baseline, as is the corresponding total cost estimate, $1.79 billion (standard error, $529 
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million). In column 8 the control group includes utilities located entirely in states that 
were not part of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group. The estimates confirm the 
results in column 7. It appears that the baseline estimates do not include the effect of 
expanding NOx regulations further West. 
Finally, it is possible that restructuring lowered utilities' expected profits. If that 
were the case, the stock prices of western utilities located in deregulated states would also 
decline. Restricting the control group to these utilities would lead to smaller abnormal 
returns for the NBP utilities. In column 9 the estimates are quite similar to column 2 of 
Table 4, suggesting that the results are not driven by restructuring per se, but rather by the 
combination of restructuring and the NBP (recall that in the absence of restructuring, the 
NBP would not have affected expected profits). 
 
Additional results 
Table 7 reports the results of several additional specifications. The cost estimates 
are generally robust to alternative estimation models. 
It may have taken more than one week for investors to fully understand the 
implications of the Michigan decision. In that case, a seven day window would not be 
sufficient. I use a one month window in column 1; the dependent variable is the 
difference between the counterfactual and the actual stock price on April 3, 2000. The 
estimates are similar to the baseline. 
Although the Michigan decision affirmed the EPA's ability to begin the NBP, the 
court did not lift the stay it had granted on May 25, 1999. As noted above, the EPA 
considered this issue a formality, but the court did not lift the stay until June 22, 2000.
25 
One might interpret June 22 as the date on which the expected probability of the 
NBP, , was equal to one, rather than March 3. In column 2 the dependent variable 
is the difference between the counterfactual and the actual price on June 29. The 
estimates are close to the previous results. 
) (P Et
An important identifying assumption is that the parameters estimated in equation 
(5) are constant from 1996-2000. Otherwise, adding observations to the estimation 
                                                 
25 It is unclear why the court did not lift the stay on March 3. In the baseline model I assume that it was 
obvious to observers that after the Michigan decision the NBP would go forward as planned, and that the 
stay was a relatively trivial obstacle. Contemporary articles in the trade press support this assumption. 
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window after March 10, 2000 would likely affect the estimated costs. In column 3 I 
include stock returns from March 11, 2000 - December 31, 2000 in estimating equation 
(5). The results are similar, which suggests that the parameters in equation (5) did not 
change. Note that these results further support the assumption that there were no 
differential profit shocks during the event period, which was the focus of Table 6. 
Another possibility is that the parameters in equation (5) varied during the 
estimation period. In that case, changing the endpoints of the estimation window would 
affect the results. In column 4 the sample used to estimate equation (5) includes 
observations from January 2, 1990 - May 31, 1995 (which predates the first meeting of 
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group), and in column 5 the sample includes January 2, 
1991 - December 29, 1995. The estimates are similar in both specifications, but I prefer 
the baseline regression because the results are more robust to other specifications. 
It is possible that counts of Ozone Transport Commission generators do not 
adequately control for shocks to northeastern utilities. The specification in column 6 
omits firms in the third column of Table 1. The estimates are similar to the baseline: the 
coal estimate is smaller, though significant at the one percent level and the natural gas/oil 
estimate is negative and insignificant. 
Given the small number of observations in these regressions, I consider whether 
the results are sensitive to outliers. In column 7 I drop the 4 firms with extreme values of 
the dependent variable, which does not affect the estimates. Omitting the four firms with 
the largest and smallest counts of coal generators (column 8) leads to a larger estimate for 
coal, though the corresponding total cost estimate is quite similar to the baseline (not 
reported). In column 9 I report a median regression, where the results are again close to 
the baseline. Thus, the results are fairly insensitive to outliers.
26
In the baseline specification I assume that all generators of a given fuel type have 
the same change in expected profits. Alternatively I could assume that the change in 
expected profits increases linearly with generating capacity. In column 10 the 
independent variables are the generating capacity, in gigawatts (GW), by region and fuel 
type, in place of generator counts. The estimates in column 10 imply similar expected 
changes in profits. Coal generators have a precisely estimated cost per GW of capacity, 
                                                 
26 The results are also insensitive to dropping one firm at a time from the baseline regression. 
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which corresponds to an annual cost per generator of $2.1 million, similar to the baseline 
figure. The estimate on natural gas/oil generators is insignificant. Note that since these 
generators are much smaller than coal, the implied cost estimate per generator ($290,000) 
is also much smaller. The total cost estimate of the NBP is close to column 2 of Table 5, 
$1.7 billion, with standard error $511 million. I prefer the baseline specification because 




This paper presents a simple method for predicting the cost of environmental 
regulation, before the regulation takes effect. I use changes in stock prices to calculate the 
expected net cost of the NBP. I exploit variation across firms in the location and type of 
generators they own to construct counterfactual stock prices and to estimate the expected 
cost of the program by generator type. I estimate an annual cost of about $2 billion, 
which is similar to previous estimates that use a bottom-up method to simulate the 
response of the entire industry to the NBP. I conclude that firms had similar expectations 
as the EPA and other economists about the effects of the program. 
More broadly, the relative simplicity of implementing event studies should make 
them useful for analyzing other proposed policies, such as greenhouse gas regulation, 
where employing the bottom-up approach may be more difficult. Event studies have not 
been widely used for environmental regulation because of a concern that unobserved 
profit shocks might bias the results, given the long time between a regulation's proposal 
and its adoption. I have investigated a number of potential demand and supply shocks, 
and this does not appear to be a serious concern with the NBP. In other contexts the event 
window may be significantly shorter if it is possible to estimate the total cost of the 
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Actual Price Counterfactual Price
Notes: Counterfactual price is the mean predicted stock price of firms with fossil fuel generators in the 
NBP region. Counterfactual prices were calculated using the predicted returns from equation (6), with 
prices normalized to one on December 29, 1995 (see text). Actual price is the average daily stock 
price of the same firms, normalized to one on the same date. The first vertical line indicates the end of 
the estimation period, December 29, 1995. The second vertical line denotes the date of the Michigan 
decision, March 3, 2000. The dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals around the 












































Actual Price Counterfactual Price
Notes: Actual prices, counterfactual prices and standard errors are computed as in Figure 1. 
The sample includes all utilities in column 3 of Table 1 (see text). 33 
Western Utilities NBP Utilities Eastern Utilities not in NBP
1 Black Hills Allegheny Energy Baltimore Gas and Electric
2 Central Louisiana Electric American Electric Power Bangor Hydro Electric
3 Idaho Power C M S Energy Central Hudson Energy
4 Montana-Dakota Utilities Carolina Power and Light Central Vermont Public Service
5 Madison Gas and Electric Cinergy Citizens Utilities
6 Minnesota Power and Light Dayton Power and Light Consolidated Edison
7 Montana Power Duquesne Light Entergy
8 Nevada Power Delmarva Power and Light FPL
9 Northwestern Public Service Detroit Edison G P U
10 Oklahoma Gas and Electric Dominion Resources Green Mountain Power
11 Otter Tail Power Duke Power Houston Industries
12 Pacific Gas and Electric Empire District Long Island Lighting
13 Pinnacle West Indianapolis Power and Light Maine Public Service 
14 Public Service Company of NM Kansas City Power and Light New York State Electric and Gas
15 Puget Sound Power and Light NIPSCO Niagara Mohawk
16 SCE Ohio Edison Northeast Utilities
17 TECO Potomac Electric Power Northern States Power CO MN
18 Texas Utilities SCANA PECO
19 Tucson Electric Power Southern Pennsylvania Power and Light
20 W P L St Joseph Light and Power Public Service Enterprise Group
21 Washington Water Power Union Electric Rochester Gas and Electric
22 Western Resources Utilicorp UGI




Investor Owned Utilities in Balanced Panel
Notes: The table lists the names of all publicly traded investor owned electric utilities, whose stock prices appear 
in the CRSP database from January 1, 1990 - December 31, 2000 (see text). Each utility was matched to the 
Department of Energy Form 860, to obtain the locations and types of its generators. Western Utilities include all 
firms whose generators are located west of the NBP region, and which do not own generators in the NBP region 
or the Northeast. NBP Utilities include firms with fossil fuel generators in the NBP region in 1995. Eastern Utilities 
Not in NBP include all other utilities.
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Western Utilities NBP Utilities Eastern Utilities not in NBP

















Panel A: Market Capitalization and Generating Capacity in 1995
Notes: Each cell reports the mean across firms in the corresponding sample, with the standard deviation in 
parentheses. Data is from CRSP, Compustat and DOE Form 860 (see text for details). Firms are assigned 
categories as in Table 1. Market capitalization is the stock price on December 29, 1995, multiplied by the 
number of shares of stock. Generating capacity is the total capacity, in MW, in 1995. Fossil fuel generating 
capacity is the total generating capacity, in MW, of coal, natural gas and oil generators in 1995. Share of 
generating capacity is the ratio of the capacity of the indicated generator type to the total generating capacity in 
the corresponding year.
Market Capitalization






Panel B: Share of Generating Capacity in Total in 1995





















Notes: Each cell contains the mean capacity of the indicated generators, in MW, from the 1995 Form 860. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses and medians are in brackets. Generators Owned by Utilities in Sample 
include all generators owned by the firms in column 2 of Table 1. All Generators in NBP include all generators 
in Form 860 in the NBP region. 
Table 3
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.11
(0.03)
0.25 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.26
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.06)
0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.04
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regressions is the difference between the counterfactual and actual price on March 10, 2000. All regressions are 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The independent variables in columns 1,2 and 4-6 are counts of 
generators in 1995, by region (the NBP region and the Northeast); column 3 uses counts of generators in 2000. 
Table 4 reports only the coefficients on the NBP variables. The independent variables are the total number of 
fossil fuel-fired generators, by region in column 1. Columns 2 and 3 include the number of coal and natural 
gas/oil generators by region. Column 4 separates natural gas and oil. Coal generators in column 5 includes coal 
generators with a capacity of at least 280MW and small coal generators include all other coal generators; 
similarly for column 6, where small natural gas/oil generators have capacities less than 40MW.
Dependent Variable: Difference Between Counterfactual And Actual Stock Prices
Table 4
Effect of the NBP on Expected Generator Profits
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes utilities in the second and third 
columns of Table 1. To construct the dependent variable, equation (5) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), using observations from January 1, 1990 to December 29, 1995. The dependent variable in equation (5) 
is the daily return for each firm with at least one generator in the Midwest or East. The independent variables are 
the average return for firms located entirely in the West, the three Fama-French factors and the average stock 
return of natural gas utilities. Counterfactual stock price is calculated using the estimated coefficients from 































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.95 2.02 1.97 1.94 2.06 2.08 2.82 1.67
(0.61) (0.59) (0.46) (0.54) (0.61) (0.58) (1.32) (1.03)
Table 5
Annual Net Cost of the NBP (Billion 2000 Dollars)
Annual Net 
Cost
Notes: Huber-White Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-6 report the estimated total annual net cost for NBP generators, using the corresponding 
estimates from columns 1-6 in Table 4. The total cost for firms in the sample is obtained by multiplying the number of generators in the sample by the 
corresponding estimate in Table 4, and by the total number of shares of stock. The total cost for NBP generators is the product of the sample cost and 
the ratio of total NBP fossil fuel generating capacity to the fossil fuel capacity in the sample. The annual cost estimate applies a six percent discount rate 
to the total cost estimate and assumes that the NBP would begin in 2004. Columns 7 and 8 report the annual cost calculated from the estimated 


























Incl Utilities in 






Incl Utilities in 
Dereg States
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 )
0.26 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.46 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.26
(0.05) (0.05) (0.18) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00







46 46 48 48 43 34 48 48 48
R
2 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.27
Coal With 
Scrubbers
column 4 include all coal generators without scrubbers. Column 5 omits the five NBP firms affected by the EPA's New Source Review litigation: AEP, 
Cinergy, Dominion, Ohio Edison and Southern. Column 6 omits firms involved in mergers between 1995 and 2000 (see text). 
Natural 
Gas/Oil
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the difference between counterfactual and actual stock prices, constructed 
as in Table 4, except in columns 7-9. Columns 7-9 report the same specification, using different utilities to construct the control group in equation (5). 
Column 7 includes utilities located in states participating in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group, but not included in the NBP. Column 8 includes 
utilities located in states that were not in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group. Column 9 uses utilities located in western states that had begun 
electricity restructuring in 2000 (see text). The independent variables are counts of generators in 1995, by type and region. All regressions are estimated 
by OLS. Column 1 includes the firm's change in profits between 1995 and 2000, and column 2 includes the change in revenues, obtained from 
Compustat. Counts of generators in Phase I of the Acid Rain Program and counts of coal generators with scrubbers were obtained from the DOE Acid 
Rain Program database (see text). Coal generators in column 3 include all coal generators not in Phase I of the Acid Rain Program. Coal generators in
Phase I Coal
Table 6
Potential Omitted Variables 










































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.27 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.63
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15)
0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.61
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (1.10)
Number of 
Observations
48 48 48 48 48 23 44 44 48 48
R
2 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.25 0.26
Natural 
Gas/Oil
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the difference between the counterfactual and actual stock price, 
constructed similarly to Table 4. In column 1 the actual stock price on April 3 is subtracted from the counterfactual price. In column 2 the actual stock 
price on June 29 is subtracted from the counterfactual price. In column 3 equation (5) is estimated using observations from January 2, 1990 - December 
29, 1995 and from March 11, 2000 - December 31, 2000. Column 4 uses observations from January 2, 1990 - May 31, 1995 and column 5 uses 
observations from January 2, 1991 - December 29, 1995. The independent variables in columns 1-9 are counts of generators, by type and region. 
Column 10 uses generator capacity, in GW, by type and region. Columns 1-8 and 10 are estimated by OLS; column 9 is a median regression. Column 6 
includes utilities with fossil fuel generators in the NBP region. Column 7 omits utilities with the two largest and two smallest values of the dependent 
variable on March 10, 2000. Column 8 omits the four utilities with the largest and smallest numbers of coal generators in the NBP region.
Table 7
Additional Robustness Results
Dependent Variable: Difference Between Counterfactual And Actual Stock Prices
Coal
 
 